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Introduction
The United States and South Korea have contrasting legal rules governing workouts, or voting in debt restructuring: the Voting Prohibition2
Rule of the United States' and the Mandatory Voting Rule of South Korea.
In the United States, the Trust Indenture Act has long prohibited voting in a
bond workout. 3 In stark contrast, South Korea has a unique statute that
mandates voting in workouts among financial institutions 4 in an effort to
resolve the twin problems of corporate insolvency crises and incompetent
bankruptcy institutions. A workout is a contract-based debt restructuring5
for insolvent companies that functions as an alternative to bankruptcy.
Workouts are designed to preserve the value of financially distressed but
economically viable companies by avoiding bankruptcy procedures. 6 Otherwise efficient workout attempts often fail in large part because numerous
creditors -individually non-pivotal actors -opportunistically (but rationally) opt to stay out of workout arrangements. 7 The voting procedure is
thought to help resolve the holdout problem. 8
1. See Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232,
232-35 (1987). The phrase "Voting Prohibition Rule" is the author's own terminology
for the U.S. system of bankruptcy and workout.
2. See generally Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act, Law No. 6504 (2001) (S.
Korea). The phrase "Mandatory Voting Rule" is the author's own terminology for the
CRPA.
3. See Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act, No. 6504 (2001), ch. Ill, art. 19, 21,
22 (S. Korea).
4. See Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act, ch. 1, art. 1.
5. See John McConnell & Henri Servaes, The Economics of Pre-PackagedBankruptcy,
in CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 322, 322 (Jagdeep S.
Bhandary & Lawrence A. Weiss eds., 1996). Arrangements for debt restructuring in
workouts include, among other things, extending a maturity date, exchanging debt for
equity, forgiving interest, and providing additional debt. For a list of similar workout
debt restructuring arrangements, see id.
6. See Stuart C. Gilson, Managing Default: Some Evidence on How Firms Choose

Between Workouts and Chapter 11,

in CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PER-

supra note 5, at 308, 319 (observing that "[d]istressed firms can preserve
more of their value by restructuring their debt privately, when possible, and thus avoi[d]
chapter 11").
7. See Robert Gertner & David Scharfstein, A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of
Reorganization Law, 46 J. FIN. 1189, 1191 (1991) (noting that creditors "with small
stakes have an incentive to hold out"); Roe, supra note 1, at 236 (noting that the buoy-up
effect for the holdouts causes workout attempts to fail).
8. See Gertner & Scharfstein, supra note 7, at 1211 (arguing that "the voting procedure can be used to internalize the effects" of reorganization and "get around the
holdout... problem").
SPECTIVES,
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Encountering unprecedented large-scale corporate insolvencies in the
late 1990s, South Korea enacted the Corporate Restructuring Promotion
Act, 9 mandating a binding vote in workouts. This law established a votebased workout mechanism, binding financial institutional lenders to a
workout arrangement if favored by a three-fourths majority. 10 In contrast,
the U.S. method laid out in the Trust Indenture Act 11 prohibits the use of a
2
binding vote in a bond workout to change core terms of a bond issue.'
This provision, aimed at protecting the interests of individual minority
bondholders from insiders' machinations, has stopped workout reorganization via voting in cases where bond issues are the major form of corporate
debt. 13 U.S. scholars and academics have challenged this U.S. voting prohibition. 14 For example, Professor Mark Roe asserts that the voting prohibition could contribute to unnecessary bankruptcies and, thus, should be
repealed. 15
The dramatic divergence between the United States and South Korean
legislative solutions offers an intriguing opportunity to examine the implications that the two approaches may have for the efficiency of workout
reorganization. This article develops a framework for analyzing and comparing the contrasting legal rules in these two jurisdictions.
Part I explains the two contrasting legal rules in the United States and
South Korea that govern voting in workout restructuring. In the absence of
statutory intervention, parties may elect whether to remain in an assentbased voluntary workout (which may be labeled the "Assent Scheme") 16 or
to contract for a voting procedure (which may be labeled the "Voting
Scheme"). 17 Legislators may intervene, however, in two distinct ways. The
United States' Voting Prohibition Rule mandates the Assent Scheme by
blocking any contract for voting in workouts,' 8 whereas South Korea's
Mandatory Voting Rule makes the Voting Scheme compulsory, providing a
statutory ground for the binding force of voting in workouts. 19
Part II describes the corporate insolvency crisis that led South Korea to
enact legislation that introduced the Mandatory Voting Rule as well as the
major features of that legislation. In the late 1990s, the South Korean econ9. See generally Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act. South Korea promulgated
this Act in response to serious financial emergencies.
10. Id. ch. IIl, art. 17(2).
11. Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 316(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2003).
12. The core terms subject to the voting prohibition include principal amount, interest rate, and maturity date. Roe, supra note 1, at 232.
13. Id. at 250-52.
14. See, e.g., id.
15. See id. at 277-79 (asserting that the protection of individual investors through
the voting prohibition needs to be reconsidered in light of the current situation where
institutional investors hold most public debts).
16. In the absence of any basis of voting for a workout (contractual or statutory), a
workout has to proceed on a consensual basis with dissenters being able to stay out of
the debt restructuring. See infra Part I.B.1.
17. See id.
18. See infra Part I.C.1.
19. See infra Part I.C.2.
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omy abruptly suffered a wave of corporate insolvency, unprecedented in its
scope and scale, that eventually lead to an economic crisis in South
Korea. 20 In 1997 alone, eight of the thirty largest business conglomerates
in South Korea (widely known as chaebol)2 1 became insolvent. 22 Although
such chaebol badly needed rapid reorganization, they were very reluctant to
file for corporate reorganization, South Korea's counterpart to the American chapter 11 bankruptcy, in large part because court practices did not
permit incumbent managers and controlling shareholders to continue running companies during bankruptcy proceedings or to retain ownership in
their companies after reorganization. 23 Also, lenders were not inclined to
rely on bankruptcy institutions because they did not believe that these
courts had the levels of expertise, experience, and flexibility necessary for
handling complex business issues involving conflicts of interest.2 4 Faced
with rigid court practices, insolvent companies sought an alternate reorganization procedure through the Composition Act, a debt renegotiation
procedure initially overseen by the courts, despite the fact that the procedure's legal effect is limited to unsecured debts. 25 Although the Composition Act very seldomly had been used before the South Korean economic
crisis, the Composition Act instantly was favored by insolvent chaebol
when they were informed that the procedure would leave control and ownership intact. 26 This attempt to circumvent the more traditional method
27
was later rejected by the Seoul District Court.
20. Sandor E. Schnick, Globalization, Bankruptcy and the Myth of the Broken Bench,
80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 219 n.7 (2006).
21. A chaebol is a group of companies under common control of a controlling family
or an individual, who usually holds less than majority ownership but exercises effective
control by a complicated pyramid and cross ownership structure. It is a common form
of corporate organization, governance, and ownership in South Korea. Pursuant to the
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, the Fair Trade Commission of South Korea
announces the list of the thirty largest chaebol in terms of asset size every April. See
Hwa-Jin Kim, Living with the IMF: A New Approach to Corporate Governance and Regulation of Financial Institutions in Korea, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 61, 63-64 (1999). Kim
characterizes chaebol as "large groupings of related corporations under highly concentrated family or individual control and a unique pattern of unrelated diversification."
Id. at 63.
22. See id. at 65 (listing the eight companies as Hanbo, Sammi, Jinro, Dainong, Kia,
New Core, Haitai, and Halla). The author was personally involved in the bankruptcy
and workout procedures of many of the insolvent chaebol, as a member of a South
Korean law firm representing them. A substantial portion of the accounts regarding the
South Korean bankruptcy crisis in this paper is based on the author's own experience as
a lawyer for these companies.
23. Elinor Kim, CorporateInsolvency Law and Practicein South Korea in the Aftermath
of the Asian Financial Crisis, CONN. J. INT'L. L. 155, 159-61 (2005).
24. Id. at 177.
25. Id. at 161.
26. Id. at 163.
27. In New Core, the Seoul District Court held that corporations who were members
of the sixty-four largest chaebol whose borrowings exceeded twenty-five billion were not
eligible to file for compulsory composition. See Sohn Sung-Tae, Seoul District Court
Rejects Composition Application for Corporations with Borrowings over 25 Billion Won,
KOREA ECON. DAILY, April 9, 1998, available at http://news.naver.com/news/read.php?
mode=LSD&officeid=015&articleid=0000090365&sectionid=101&menuid=101.
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Dissatisfied with the existing bankruptcy institutions, corporate borrowers and financial lenders often engaged in workouts, establishing a voting-based workout mechanism by an agreement entitled the Corporate
Restructuring Accord. 28 Corporate borrowers and financial lenders, however, encountered serious holdout problems with non-signatories, such as
foreign creditors, as well as certain procedural defects. 2 9 Against this backdrop, the South Korean Legislature enacted the Corporate Restructuring
Promotion Act. This new law required a statutory vote-based workout
mechanism that would apply to debts held by all financial institutional
creditors. 30 After Hynix Semiconductor Company (formerly known as
Hyundai Electronics Company) utilized this mechanism, 3 1 a number of
insolvent companies went through the vote-based workouts under the
32

law.

Part III of this paper analyzes the implications of the U.S. and South
Korean legal rules for efficiency of debt restructuring. The analysis begins
by identifying two effects that a workout may have on the parties' wealth.
A workout may well have a significant impact on the total value of a corporate borrower (the efficiency effect). On the other hand, a workout may
also affect the allocation of such value among creditors (the value-diversion
effect). Each of the two voting rules has its own value-diversion effect
which in turn influences the efficiency effect. Under the Voting Prohibition Rule, value may flow from the participating creditors to the non-participating creditors because the participants' concessions in a workout may
boost the financial ability of corporate borrowers to repay the creditors
who hold oUt. 3 3 In contrast, under the Mandatory Voting Rule, value may
shift from minority creditors to majority creditors. 3 4 With debt restructurThe court reasoned that compulsory composition was designed for small companies.
Id.
28. Kim, supra note 23, at 168.
29. See id. at 168 n. 135; see generally Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act.
30. See Kim, supra note 23, at 168-69.
31. See History of Hynix Semiconductor Co., http://www.hynix.com/eng/Olabout/
01_profile/profile_- 06.jsp (last visited Aug. 25, 2007). Hynix Semiconductor Company
changed its name in March 2001 and emerged early from the CRPA in July 2005. See id.
32. From September 2001 to June 2007, seventy-one companies with three hundred
or more employees underwent the CRPA restructuring procedures. Forty-nine of these
companies successfully finished the CRPA process. See Lee Sun-Young, Seventy Percent
Success Rate for Big Firm Restructuring, KOREA HERALD, July 18, 2007, available at http://
www.kdb.co.kr/weblogic/Board?BID=25&NID=26663&ACTION=VIEW&NPAGE=16.
33. See Roe, supra note 1, at 236 (observing that a workout will leave a company to
pay debt to the holdout bondholders in full).
34. Empirical evidence suggests that there are substantial private benefits of control.
See, e.g., Michael J. Barclay & Clifford G. Holderness, Private Benefits from Control of
Public Corporations, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 371, 372 (1989). Barclay and Holderness suggest
that "premiums paid for large-percentage blocks reflect the private benefits that accrue
to the block owner." Id. at 373. They also found that "trades of large-percentage blocks
of common stock are typically priced at substantial premiums to the exchange price,"
that the block-trade prices average twenty percent above the post-announcement
exchange price, and that "[tihe average premium is $4 million (in GNP-price-deflated
1982 dollars), which represents 13% of the block-purchase price and 4% of the value of
the firm's equity." Id. at 372.
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ing binding on all creditors, majority creditors who control the voting procedure may disproportionately benefit from the reorganization, which I
label "private benefits from control of workout."
This analysis also shows when efficient or inefficient workouts may
take place under each rule.- The Mandatory Voting Rule will facilitate any
proposed efficient workout, but it also enables some inefficient workouts to
take place. The latter may happen when majority creditors favor a workout
plan, not because it enhances the total value of a company, but because the
workout procedure provides an opportunity to capture disproportionate
benefits. The Voting Prohibition Rule, however, prevents any inefficient
proposed workout, and in this regard, it is superior to the Mandatory Voting Rule. The disadvantage of the Voting Prohibition Rule is that it may fail
to facilitate some efficient workouts when the efficiency gain is not greater
than the value shifted to the non-participants. Thus, there is a trade-off
between the facilitation of efficient workouts and the deterrence of inefficient workouts. This article identifies certain circumstances under which
one of the two rules is superior to the other. When creditors are numerous
and not individually pivotal to the workout, the Mandatory Voting Rule
may be more appropriate because the holdout problem may be acute. In
contrast, when a handful of financial institutions hold the majority of debt
claims with a few minor bondholders, the Voting Prohibition Rule is better
suited because major creditors may successfully negotiate a workout with
each other.
Under the Mandatory Voting Rule, reducing private benefits from control will align the majority creditors' incentives more closely with the overall efficiency of a workout. The workout procedure under the Mandatory
Voting Rule can be perceived as, in effect, alternative bankruptcy reorganization because of the mandatory voting. Ironically, although the
Mandatory Voting Rule is designed to establish an effective mechanism for
facilitating reorganization outside of bankruptcy, it may result in a less
attractive type of workout in terms of saving bankruptcy costs. A workout
is a bargain to the parties, and a voting scheme can still be a part of the
35
bargain as long as it is based on the consensus of the participants.
Therefore, there is good reason to suspect that the Mandatory Voting Rule
in South Korea may not fall completely within the nature of a workout.
I.

Two Rules on Voting in Workouts

A.

Workouts: Reorganization Outside of Bankruptcy

Financial stress of an otherwise economically viable company requires
an orderly reorganization of its capital (i.e., debt and equity). 36 Companies can undertake reorganization either within, or outside of, bankruptcy
35. See Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act, Law No. 6504, ch. ll, art. 17(2)
(2001) (S. Korea).
36. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101
HARv, L. REv. 775, 776 (1988).
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procedures. Chapter 11 of the American Bankruptcy Code 3 7 sets the reorganization framework within bankruptcy, but reorganization outside of
38
bankruptcy is referred to as a workout.
When a company is financially stressed, both the underlying financial
difficulty and the possibility of an ensuing bankruptcy procedure involve
substantial costs. 3 9 Suppliers and consumers are reluctant to transact with
a company in financial distress, 40 and skilled workers may leave the firm.
Instead of concentrating solely on business operations, managers divert
their time and attention to bankruptcy-related matters. 4 1 Furthermore, the
direct costs associated with filing for a bankruptcy petition are not negligible. 4 2 Financial constraints force a debt-stricken company to pass up otherwise efficient investment opportunities. 4 3 The prolonged duration of the
bankruptcy proceedings 44 serves to dissipate the value of the firm. Moreover, conflicts of interest between creditors and shareholders and between
multiple creditors can be another source of significant costs arising from
financial difficulties. 45 Faced with financial stress, shareholders and managers may well favor suboptimal investment opportunities with abnormally
high risks. 4 6 The competing rush by creditors to collect debt may undermine the total value of the company as well. 47 Bankruptcy proceedings are
intended to address some of these concerns by enabling the owners of the
firm's assets (creditors as well as shareholders, in the context of bank37. See generally Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (2005).

38. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, CorporateGovernance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 669, 677
(1993).
39. See Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 780 (observing that the inevitable delay in bankruptcy involves significant costs).
40. See Tim C. Opler & Sheridan Titman, FinancialDistress and CorporatePerformance, 49J. FIN. 1015, 1016-17 (1994) (finding that highly leveraged firms lose market
share in an industry downturn, reflecting a reluctance by customers to do business with
distressed firms).
41. See id. at 1015.
42. See Gilson, supra note 6, at 311-12 (stating that "academic studies have found
that average legal and professional fees reported by chapter 11 companies range from
2.8 percent to 7.5 percent of total assets"); cf. id. at 308 (noting that "LTV Corporation,
for example, has spent over $150 million on legal and other professional fees since it
filed for chapter 11 in 1986").
43. See Gertner & Scharfstein, supra note 7, at 1191 (noting that because creditors
"claim part of the cash flows from new investment, distressed firms can have difficulty
issuing equity or debt for new investment," which may lead them to "pass up positive net
present value investments").
44. Chapter 11 procedures normally take two to three years. See Roe, supra note 1,
at 236.
45. See David M. Cutler & Lawrence H. Summers, The Costs of Conflict Resolution
and Financial Distress: Evidence from the Texaco-Pennzoil Litigation, 19 RAND J. ECON.
157, 158 (1988) (concluding that, based on the dispute and subsequent settlement
between Texaco and Pennzoil, "financial conflict can have substantial effects on
productivity").
46. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 38, at 683-84 (observing that the holders of
junior interests have reason to prefer high risk investments).
47. See Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Casefor CorporateReorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL
STUD. 127, 133 (1986).
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48

ruptcy) to act collectively.
Comparatively, reorganization via workout aims to reduce the costs
49
Creditors voluntarily
that arise from financial stress and bankruptcy.

consent to a package of reorganization arrangements, such as maturity
date extension, debt-for-equity exchange, forgiveness of interest, and provision of additional debt, based50 on the belief that they stand to benefit from
such voluntary concessions.
Law and economic scholars have long recognized that holdouts by
individually small, but collectively substantial, creditors are a principal
impediment to the success of workouts. 5 1 The enhancement of the financial capability of a corporate debtor through a workout enables the debtor
to better service debt owed to non-participants. Hence, numerous minor
creditors rationally and opportunistically decline to participate in a
workout. If these individually non-pivotal creditors, taken together, are
substantial enough to dissuade other creditors from agreeing5 2 to workout
arrangements, an otherwise efficient workout effort will fail.
B. Voting: A Solution to Holdouts
1.

The Assent Scheme and the Voting Scheme

Voting can be an effective way to resolve the holdout problem in a
workout. With a voting scheme in place, a reorganization arrangement,
passed by a vote of the creditors, binds the entire group of creditors subject
to the voting scheme (voting group), notwithstanding individual dissents to
the arrangement, thereby preventing minor creditors from disproportionately benefiting from a holdout.5 3 The purpose of voting is that, once
voted on, workout arrangements have binding force on the entire voting
group. The voting scheme helps remove opportunistic incentives by virtue
of individual creditors
of such binding force and thereby aligns the interest
54
with the interests of the aggregate voting group.
I label the workout reorganization scheme that lacks a voting mechanism the "assent scheme," because the reorganization is effective only to
the assenting creditors. In contrast, I label the workout reorganization
scheme with a binding vote, irrespective of the ground of the binding force,
the "voting scheme."
48. Id. at 135.
49. See Gilson, supra note 6, at 319 (finding that "the professional fees incurred in
exchange offers are about one-tenth of those incurred in a typical chapter 11 case").
50. In this sense, a workout can be viewed as an application of the Coase theorem.
See Roe, supra note 1, at 236 (stating that "Ronald Coase's famous theorem suggests
that, in the absence of transaction costs, the incentives of those financially interested in
the nearly bankrupt firm would be to contract to the efficient solution").
51. See, e.g., Gertner & Scharfstein, supra note 7, at 1191; Gilson, supra note 6, at
316.
52. See Gertner & Scharfstein, supra note 7, at 1190-191.
53. Id. at 1211.
54. See id. (positing that "the voting procedure does not allow public debtholders to
be treated differently depending on their vote, whereas tendering and non-tendering
public debtholders are treated differently").
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Classifying the Voting Scheme

We may distinguish different types of voting schemes by using two
different criteria: (a) the ground of the binding force and (b) the scope of
the voting group. With regard to the first criterion, the ground of the binding force, a voting scheme requires a basis, either contractual or statutory,
for its binding force on the voting group, which includes dissenting creditors. 5 5 A contractual basis exists where creditors voluntarily submit to a
voting scheme through any form of consent. 5 6 Creditors may enter into
such a voting contract before or after a financial difficulty arises. In contrast, a statutory basis arises from a law that gives voting binding force and
thereby mandates a voting-based workout. 57 A statutory ground within
bankruptcy can be found in chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which
uses a voting scheme for reorganization via bankruptcy. 5 8 With regard to
the second criterion, scope of the voting group, debts can be either homogeneous or heterogeneous among the group with respect to their terms,
such as priority, maturity date, and interest rate. A homogeneous voting
group consists of debts having identical terms; a heterogeneous voting
group is comprised of debts having different terms. 59 For example, a voting group that consists of both secured long-term bank loans and
unsecured short-term commercial papers is heterogeneous.
The distinction between homogeneous and heterogeneous voting
groups is of great importance because there can be a clear discrepancy
between the two groups in terms of the existence and extent of conflicts of
interest among creditors in a voting group. A homogeneous voting group
encompasses few, if any, conflicts among creditors thanks to the plausible
convergence of interests resulting from the likeness of debts. In contrast, a
heterogeneous voting group may well suffer from material conflicts of
interest among creditors holding debts of differing terms. Examples of
such conflicts can be easily imagined. When a company's assets can just
barely service senior debts but fall well short of covering junior debts, creditors of junior debts have good reason to vote in favor of debt rescheduling,
whereas senior creditors will naturally oppose the reorganization. Such
intra-heterogeneous group conflicts may cause the incentives of some creditors to diverge from the creditor group in the aggregate. This type of diver60
gence may result in an inefficient reorganization.
55. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein, Optimal Debt Structure and the
Number of Creditors, 104J. POL. EcON. 1, 17 (1996) (providing an example of indentures
in credit agreements).
56. See, e.g., id.
57. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reorganization Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c)-(d) (2005).
58. Id.; see also LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 38, at 677 (pointing out that one of
the advantages of bankruptcy reorganization is that "specified majorities of creditors can
bind dissenting minorities of the same class through voting").
59. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 47, at 131.
60. See, e.g., id. at 132-33. See infra Part III for a discussion of the mechanisms by
which major creditors' incentives may deviate from the total value maximization because
of such misalignment of interest.
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Two Statutory Interventions with Voting: Prohibition and Mandate

In the absence of statutory intervention, parties may freely choose
between a voting scheme and an assent scheme. However, the United
States and South Korea have two starkly contrasting forms of statutory
interventions. The United States' rule prohibits creditors from voluntarily
submitting to a voting scheme, 61 whereas the South Korean rule sets up
62
and mandates such a scheme.
1.

The United States: The Voting ProhibitionRule

The American rule, the Voting Prohibition Rule, mandates the assent
scheme by blocking or invalidating parties' voluntary submission to a voting scheme. 63 Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act bans any binding
vote by bondholders, based on a majority action clause in a bond indenture, to change any core term, such as principal amount, interest rate, or
maturity date of a bond issue.6 4 The prohibition is meant to prevent
insider bondholders (who may hold a greater percentage of shares as well)
and the investment banks (who are driven by pursuit of business opportunities) from pursuing their own interests at the expense of the other
65
bondholders.
The Voting Prohibition Rule stops a voting-based workout, a presumably effective way to solve the holdout problem. 66 Although exchange offers
conditioned on exit consent, 6 7 which is intended to strip untendered debts
of covenant protections, have been used as a substitute for voting, 68 they
may not necessarily eliminate the holdout problem. 69 Professor Mark Roe
proposed that the Voting Prohibition Rule be repealed and replaced with a
flexible standard prohibiting fraud and distortions in bond
70
recapitalizations.
2.

South Korea: The Mandatory Voting Rule

The Mandatory Voting Rule, by providing a statutory source for the
binding force of voting, sets up a voting scheme without requiring creditors
61. See Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 316(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2003).
62. Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act, Law No. 6504, ch. III, art. 17 (2001) (S.
Korea).
63. See Roe, supra note 1, at 232.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 251-52.
66. Id. at 239-40.
67. The exit consent is based on the Trust Indenture Act's failure to prohibit a simple- or super-majority vote to change or eliminate covenants of a nominal debt amount.
Id. at 248.
68. See Gertner & Scharfstein, supra note 7, at 1191 (noting that, due to the Trust
Indenture Act, public debt restructurings almost always involve an exchange of new
securities and cash for the original debt).
69. See Roe, supra note 1, at 247 (maintaining that an exit consent is not assured of
diminishing the buoying-up effect accompanying the holdout problem); see also Gertner
& Scharfstein, supra note 7, at 1191.
70. See Roe, supra note 1, at 232-35.
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to voluntarily submit to such a scheme. 7 1 The Corporate Restructuring
Promotion Act of South Korea constitutes a unique example of the
mandatory voting rule. 72 Under this law, a three-fourths majority vote (in
terms of debt amount held) is binding on all financial institution creditors
73
in South Korea.
II.

The Mandatory Voting Rule of South Korea

A.

Background

1.

Crisis of Corporate Insolvencies

The South Korean economy abruptly suffered severe hardship in the
late 1990s. 74 The well-known economic crisis began with a series of largescale corporate insolvencies in 199775 whose scope and scale were tremendous and unprecedented. 7 6 In 1997 alone, eight of the thirty largest business conglomerates, or chaebol, became insolvent and were unable to repay
their overdue debts. 7 7 In the first half of the year, two major chaebol,
Hanbo and Sammi, filed for corporate reorganization, the South Korean
counterpart to chapter 11 bankruptcy. 78 In the latter half of the year, more
chaebol such as Jinro, Kia, New Core, Haitai, Halla, and Dainong became
insolvent. 79 The insolvencies were mainly blamed on high leverage,8 0
71. See Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act, Law No. 6504, ch. III, art. 17 (2001)
(S. Korea).
72. See, e.g., id. See generally Sandy Shandro, U.K.'s Chapter 11 Plan: Schemes of
Arrangement, 25 Am.BANKR. INST. L. REV. 30 (2006) (explaining that the United Kingdom's regime on restructuring and voting schemes resembles that of the United States
more than that of South Korea).
73. Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act, ch. III, art. 17. The Act applies to every
conceivable form of domestic financial institution, including domestic branches of foreign banks. The Act sets up a heterogeneous voting group because financial institutions'
held debts are subject to the voting scheme irrespective of their terms. Kim, supra note
23, at 168.

74. See

ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION &

DEV.,

OECD

REVIEWS

OF REGULATORY

REFORM: REGULATORY REFORM IN KOREA 11 (2000).
75. See NAM-KEE LEE, TOWARD A MATURE MARKET ECONOMY: COMPETITION LAW

& POLICY IN KOREA 3-10 (2002) (describing the practices that led to the corporate insolvencies
in the late 1990s).
76. Prior to 1997, the bankruptcy of major South Korean corporations was exceptional and anecdotal, due in part to preferential financial support from banks in the
form of additional loans. For this reason, the importance of bankruptcy institutions had
not been previously well-recognized. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., supra
note 74, at 23, 37.
77. See Kim, supra note 21, at 65 (reporting that some large chaebol went into bankruptcy in 1997, including Hanbo, Sammi, Jinro, Dainong, Kia, New Core, Haitai, and
Halla).
78. YOUNGJAE LIM, KOREA DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE, RESTRUCTURING OF CORPORATE SECTOR AND CONGLOMERATES IN POST-CRISIS KOREA (2003).

79. Id.
80. The average debt-to-equity ratio of South Korean corporations was about five
times higher than that of Taiwan and the United Kingdom. See Ok-Rial Song, The Legacy
of Controlling Minority Structure: A Kaleidoscope of Corporate Governance Reform in
Korean Chaebol, 34 LAw & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 183, 191 (2003). By the end of 1997, the
average debt-to-equity ratio of the thirty largest chaebol reached 519 percent of shareholder equity. See Kim, supra note 21, at 64.
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intra-chaebolcross guarantees, and imprudent over-investment. 8 1
Bigger insolvencies ensued. In 1999, Daewoo Group-the second largest chaebol at the time-became insolvent. 8 2 In addition, Hyundai Electronics and Hyundai Engineering & Construction, two flagship members of
the then-largest chaebol, Hyundai, fell into financial difficulties and had to
83
renegotiate debt with lenders.
Banks and other lenders were exposed to, and seriously struck by, the
huge wave of corporate insolvencies as loans to these insolvent chaebol
became non-performing. 84 A number of lenders verged on insolvency
themselves. 85 Several of these lenders were liquidated8 6 or bailed out
through capital injections from the South Korean government. 8 7 An effective mechanism was urgently needed to deal with the sweeping nationwide
insolvency crisis.
2.

Incompetence of Bankruptcy Institutions

Reorganization and liquidation are the two major bankruptcy institutions between which insolvent companies may choose. As for reorganization, while South Korea had a full-fledged reorganization apparatus, the
Corporate Reorganization Act, which is similar to the chapter 11 procedure
in the United States,8 8 there also was a limited-scale reorganization procedure, the Composition Act. 89 The latter was a court-overseen procedure in
which a majority vote of creditors had to resolve a renegotiation of
unsecured debt, which was later confirmed by a court, thereby binding the
entirety of unsecured debts. 90 Secured claims were not subject to the Com81. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., supra note 74, at 37-38 (describing
inadequacies in pre-1997 insolvency procedures as well as the reforms of reorganization
procedures in 1998 and 1999).
82. Don Kirk, For Daewoo's Founder, Pride Before the Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2001,
at W1.
83. See Tong Whan Park, South Korea in 1998: Swallowing the Bitter Pills of Restructuring, 39 ASIAN SURVEY 133, 138 (1999). For more information on the Hyundai chaebol,
see Peter M. Beck, Revitalizing Korea's Chaebol, 38 ASIAN SURVEY 1018, 1024-30 (1998).
84. Non-performing assets are debts whose issuers have fallen into financial difficulties. See KOREA ASSET MANAGEMENT CORP. (KAMCO), REPORT ON NON-PERFORMING ASSET
MANAGEMENT FUND 23 (2001); see also Kim, supra note 21, at 65 (stating that by October
1997, South Korean commercial banks and merchant banks were saddled with 28.52
trillion won and 3.89 trillion won, respectively, in non-performing loans). South Korean
financial institutions' non-performing loans amounted to 100 trillion won by October,
2001. See id. at 154-59.
85. See Kim, supra note 21, at 65.
86. Examples of such liquidated banks include Daedong Bank, Dongnam Bank,
Dongwha Bank, Chungcheong Bank, and Kyungki Bank. See John Burton, South Korean
Banks Forced Into Mergers, FIN. TIMES, June 29, 1998, at 4.
87. Examples of such banks include Korea First Bank (which was later acquired by
Standard Chartered Bank) and Seoul Bank. See Sheryl WuDunn, Bankruptcy the Asian
Way: No Sinking, No Swimming, Just Floating Face Down, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1998, at C1.
88. See Kim, supra note 23, at 164.
89. See id. at 163.
90. See id.
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position Act. 91 Until 1997, the Composition Act had not been perceived as
a procedure for corporate bankruptcies and, thus, had almost never been
92
used by insolvent companies in the past.
Controlling shareholders and managers of such insolvent chaebol companies immediately faced the problem that they could find no reason to
seek corporate reorganization because of rigid court practices on management and ownership of companies in the procedure. 9 3 Courts had administered corporate reorganizations in such a way that incumbent managers
and controlling shareholders had been precluded from managing or owning the bankrupt company, 94 even though the Corporate Reorganization
Act did not necessarily require this.9 5 In 1996, the Supreme Court of
South Korea had set a rule requiring that reorganization plans seeking
court approval provide for cancellation of the shares held by controlling
shareholders. 9 6 This rule was made after high profile scandals involving
corporate reorganization and in response to widespread criticisms that
controllers could abuse corporate reorganization to entrench themselves at
the expense of other constituents, including creditors. Lower-level courts
in charge of bankruptcy cases after the ruling have since strictly adhered to
this requirement. According to this rule, controlling shareholders would
97
invariably lose ownership at the conclusion of corporate reorganization.
Furthermore, in contrast to practices in the United States, South
Korean courts did not allow for debtors-in-possession. 98 Upon receipt of a
filing for corporate reorganization, the court would appoint a trustee to run
the company during the procedure and draw up and propose a reorganization plan for approval by creditors and the court. 9 9 In search of candidates
91. In practice, secured debts were renegotiated at the same time on an individual
assent basis, although creditors' resolutions did not affect the entitlements of secured
debts. Such individual secured debt renegotiation can be viewed as a workout arrangement concomitant to a bankruptcy institution. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 164.
94. See id.
95. Corporate Reorganization Act, Law No. 172, art. 221(3)-(4) (1952) (S. Korea),
provides that where total liabilities exceed total assets, not less than half of a company's
issued stock shall be cancelled and two-thirds of the stock held by controlling shareholders who are liable for the financial stress shall be cancelled.
96. See CHOI DU-YUL, PROBLEMS AND WAYS TO IMPROVE THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 20 (2001), available at http://www.fki.or.kr/Common/Download.
aspx?id=0b18c92f-4757-4441-8daf-b57ba5e3771f. The Supreme Court Litigation Rule
No. 487 stated that the stocks held by dominant shareholders should be cancelled in the
proceeding. The rule was relaxed by an amendment in 1998, which prescribed that
more than two-thirds of dominant stock will be cancelled only where it is objectively
proved that dominant shareholders inflicted material damage on the company. See Kim,
supra note 23, at 164.
97. See Kim, supra note 23, at 164.
98. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 38, at 679-80 (observing that upon filing
for reorganization, the debtor's management continued in office and played a central
role in setting the business and reorganization plan).
99. See Kim, supra note 23, at 165-67, 175. The court usually appointed trustees
from a pre-arranged pool that consisted mainly of retired corporate executives and
retired bank officers and employees. It usually took one to two years to have a reorganization plan resolved by creditors and confirmed by the court. However, the bankrupt
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for trustees, courts had ruled out incumbent managers and controlling
shareholders. 10 0 Furthermore, shareholders were not entitled to vote on a
reorganization plan where a bankrupt company's liabilities exceeded its
assets. 101
Under these circumstances, controlling shareholders of chaebol-who
usually hold less than a majority stake 10 2 -could exercise little, if any, bargaining power in a corporate reorganization procedure once it commenced. 10 3 The rigid practices on corporate governance in corporate
reorganization strongly dissuaded controllers from initiating bankruptcy
proceedings at all costs. This institutional feature could exacerbate the
problem arising from the conflicting interests of shareholders and creditors
by deterring shareholders from initiating the corporate reorganization procedure. During the delayed period, controlling shareholders could engage
in abnormally high-risk and value-decreasing projects to the detriment of
creditors in order to make a grab for dim upside potential.
Creditors were also reluctant to actively seek corporate reorganization.
The Accounting Rule required financial institutions to render, relative to
the level prevailing under other types of debt renegotiation processes, a
more inflexible write-down of debts against a firm under a bankruptcy profirm still would be managed by its trustee from the time the reorganization plan was
approved through the termination of the reorganization proceeding. Trustees were likely
to lack the requisite expertise in the particular industry as well as the appropriate incentives to maximize the firm's value.
100. Due to the cancellation of the control block and because incumbent managers
were excluded from being appointed as trustees, the controllers of corporations were
extremely reluctant to file for Corporate Reorganization. In 2002, there were only 10
filings with the Seoul District Court. Recently, in an effort to induce more filings, the
Bankruptcy Division of the Seoul District Court suggested the possibility of change in
that practice, stating that it will positively contemplate appointing a trustee from incumbent management or its nominee. See JAEwAN PARK, THE WORLD BANK, GLOBAL INSOLVENcY LAw DATABASE: SOUTH KOREA §§ 1.4, 3.6, 3.8, 4.4, 4.6, 4.9, 7.4.2, 8.1 (2003); see
also Kim, supra note 23, at 164.
101. The voting right was not extended to shareholders because they did not stand to
receive any distributions upon liquidation. Corporate Reorganization Act, Law No.
172, art. 129(3) (1952) (S. Korea). As to the rationale for this provision, see CHAE-HONG
LIM & CHANG-HOON BAEK, CORPORATE REORGANIZATION LAW (HoISAJEONGRIBEOB) 579 (2d
ed. 2002).
102. Most controlling shareholders in Korea can be characterized as "minority controlling shareholders," whose control is maintained via a complex pyramid or crossholding ownership structure. See Lucian Arye et al., Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership,
and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Controlfrom CashFlow Rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 295, 296 (Randall K. Morck ed.,
2000) (showing that "the agency costs imposed by controlling shareholders who have a
small minority of the cash-flow rights in their companies can be an order of magnitude
larger than those imposed by controlling shareholders who hold a majority of the cashflow rights"); see also Song, supra note 80, at 196 (positing that "the controlling shareholders of a Korean chaebol do not have majority shares in each firm, and very often less
than 10% of total outstanding shares are sufficient to effectively gain control over the
group companies" and that Korean chaebol have developed so-called circular shareholdings to attain minority controlling structure).
103. See id.
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ceeding. 10 4 In addition, the South Korean court system did not provide for
05
a separate bankruptcy court with specialized bankruptcy judges.'
Instead, two particular divisions of the Seoul District Court dealt with
most of the major bankruptcy cases. 10 6 Judges in charge of bankruptcy
cases, usually remaining for a two-year term in accordance with periodic
rotation practices, were likely to lack the necessary expertise and experience to deal effectively with the business and financial complexities of the
cases before them.
Faced with such an unsatisfactory bankruptcy system, the controllers
of insolvent chaebol, with the help of their legal advisors, sought an alternative that would enable them to maintain control and ownership while
restructuring debt. Their search resulted in the discovery of compulsory
composition. 10 7 They found that although compulsory composition had
been a dormant apparatus until then, it could be a way out from the
impasse in that the procedure did not impact the control and ownership of
a bankrupt company. 10 8 Jinro Group was the first to file for the procedure
and succeeded in rescheduling debt via the Composition Act. 109 Several
chaebol such as Kia, Haitai, Halla, and New Core sought the same solution
to renegotiate debts with creditors while keeping control and ownership
structures intact. 100 In the earliest of these cases, courts permitted the use
of the Composition Act procedure."'. However, encountering criticism
that the Composition Act was being exploited to get around the obstacles
preventing entrenchment via corporate reorganization, courts refused to
proceed with the Composition Act in 1998.112 From that time, corporate
reorganization has been the sole bankruptcy institution available to large
companies seeking to restructure debt.

104. According to § 27 of the version of the South Korean Bank Accounting Rule then
in effect, if a debtor was under corporate reorganization proceedings, then not less than
20% of the portion expected to be paid could be written down (classified as "substandard"), with the portion expected not to be repaid written off. In contrast, in the case of
a workout procedure, the ratio of such a write-down was between 2% and 20% (classified as "precautionary" or "substandard").
105. A separate bankruptcy court is characteristic of the U.S. legal system. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, United States Bankruptcy Courts, http://www.us
courts.gov/bankruptcycourts.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2007).
106. The Seoul District Court has jurisdiction over corporations whose main office is
in Seoul, which is true for many major chaebol companies in South Korea. Other district
courts also have a specific division that deals with bankruptcy cases.
107. See Composition Act, Law No. 997, ch. I, art. 1 (1998) (S. Korea).
108. The Composition Act involves only debt restructuring, leaving the ownership
structure intact. See Kim, supra note 23, at 163.
109. John A. Mathews, Fashioning a New Korean Model Out of the Crisis (Japan Policy
Research Inst., Working Paper No. 46, 1998), available at http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp46.html.
110. See id.
111. See Kim, supra note 23, at 163.
112. Kim, supra note 23, at 167. For a discussion of the Seoul District Court's holding, see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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ContractualApproach Towards Voting in Workouts: The Accord

Dissatisfied with bankruptcy institutions, lenders and insolvent companies sought reorganizations outside of bankruptcy, or workouts. In June
1998, major South Korean financial institutions reached an agreement
among themselves, entitled the Corporate Restructuring Accord
(Accord), 11 3 establishing a consensual voting scheme for workouts. 114 The
Accord can be characterized as a "master" agreement in that it can potentially apply to every financially distressed corporate debtor whose debt size
exceeds a given threshold amount, thereby providing a general framework
for voting-based workouts.
Under the Accord, the principal lender of a subject debtor firm is enti1
tled to initiate a workout procedure by convening a creditors' meeting. 15
The exercise of subject debts is suspended pending approval of a workout
arrangement.1 6 A three-fourths majority vote in favor of a workout proposal binds all signatory financial creditors. 1 17 The Accord applied to a number of insolvent chaebol, including Daewoo Group.18
The Accord did not completely eliminate the holdout problem. Foreign lenders-none of which were signatories to the Accord' 1 9 -held substantial portions of the debts of large insolvent companies, a factor that
caused significant holdout problems under the Accord. When a corporate
debtor was subject to a workout procedure under the Accord, resulting in
the suspension and renegotiation of debts held by Accord-signatory creditors, foreign creditors benefited from such arrangements in recovering their
debts. 120 Foreign creditors thus stood to gain disproportionately from
113. The signatories of the Accord were 130 financial institutions, such as banks,
insurance companies, investment trust companies (which manage unit trusts), and
merchant banks. See National Assembly Member Un-Tae Kang, Report on Bill for the
Corporate Restructuring Act 7 (2001), available at http://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/jsp/
BillDetail.jsp?billid-016943.
114. The Accord may be viewed in part as a "regulatory" effort to curb the corporate
bankruptcy crisis, given that regulatory agencies were said to have taken an informal
role in recommending and encouraging financial firms to sign the Accord.
115.

See CHAN-HYUN SOHN, KOREA'S FIRST CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING SINCE THE FINAN-

cIAl CRISIS 45 (2002), availableat http://www.kiep.go.kr/publication/std-rept-view.asp
?num=131689&sCate=013001&lTp=r&nowPage=7&listCnt=15#.
116. See id.
117. Such a vote contractually obliges each signatory firm to sign and comply with
any workout arrangement that is authorized by a workout resolution irrespective of
whether the signatory firm assents to that particular resolution.
118. From its inception until June 2001, the Accord was applied to workout proceedings for 104 corporate debtors. See COMM. OF FIN. & ECON. OF CONG., LEGISLATIVE
REVIEW REPORT ON THE BILL OF THE CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING PROMOTION ACT (2001).

119. Non-signatories of the Accord include foreign creditors, non-financial creditors,
and even certain domestic financial creditors such as securities houses.
120. In collecting their debts, foreign creditors primarily resorted to two methods.
One was to present bank-clearable promissory notes issued by a debtor company. This
was highly effective because the failure to honor such notes would result in the suspension of financial transactions pursuant to the Seoul Clearinghouse Rule, which constitutes an event of default under most debt covenants. To resolve this problem, the Seoul
Clearinghouse Rule, art. 78(1), now exempts such companies from suspension despite
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workouts. 12 1 The higher the proportion of debt held by foreign creditors,
122
the less likely domestic creditors would agree to a workout.
B. Legislative Requirements for Voting in Workouts
In 2001, the Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act (CRPA), which
set up an alternate statutory reorganization scheme in light of the drawbacks of the bankruptcy institutions and the Accord, replaced the
Accord. 12 3 When the CRPA was enacted, the most outstanding concern
with debt recapitalization via workout in South Korea was Hynix Electronics Company, formerly known as Hyundai Electronics Company. The
CRPA supports voting in workout by providing the basis for making a vote
binding. 124 The Accord is widely regarded as having laid a practical foun25
dation for the CRPA.'
1.

Scope of Application

The voting scheme of the CRPA applies to debt claims held by stipulated financial institutions (subject financial creditors), including, among
others, banks, insurance companies, securities houses, mutual funds, unit
trust funds, asset-backed securitization funds, the Korean Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Korea Asset Management Corporation.' 26 Particularly, in view of the holdout by foreign creditors under the Accord, the
CRPA expands the scope of its application to branches of foreign banks
located in South Korea. 12 7 With regard to the size of borrowers, the CRPA
applies to corporate borrowers whose debts subject to the CRPA are greater
than or equal to 50 billion South Korean won (KRW), which is approximately $50 million U.S. dollars. 128 The CRPA furnishes a potentially powerful mechanism by which most corporate debts, other than trade and tort
claims, can be renegotiated.
failing to honor a note. The other method was to receive judgment on debts and then
obtain levies on the assets of the debtor.
121. See Roe, supra note 1, at 236 (characterizing the buoying-up effect as a disproportionate benefit for the holdouts from staying out of debt recapitalization).
122. Id.
123. The objective of the CRPA is to facilitate corporate restructuring by facilitating
market function. See Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act, Law No. 6504, ch. I, art. 1
(2001) (S. Korea); see also Kim, supra note 23, at 168-69.
124. See Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act, ch. III, art. 17.
125. The drafters of the CRPA, recognizing the structural similarity to the Accord,
provided that resolutions and debt restructuring under the Accord are deemed to be
rendered pursuant to the CRPA. See Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act, Addenda,
art. 3; see also Kim, supra note 23, at 169.
126. Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act, ch. I, art. 2(1). As of September 2001,
approximately 420 financial creditors were subject to the CRPA. See Park Hyun-dong,
Minimizing Bank Management for Faltering Enterprises, KUKMIN ILBO, Sept. 27, 2001 (S.
Korea), available at http://news.naver.com/news/read.php?mode=LSD&office-id=005&
article id=0000071324&sectionid=101&menuid=101.
127. Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act, ch. I, art. 2(1)(a).
128. Id. ch. 1, art. 2(4).
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Workout Procedureand Voting Requirement

The principal lender to a corporation is entitled to initiate a workout
process when the lender deems the borrower company to have difficulty
repaying debts as they become due without external financial assistance or
an extraordinary borrowing. 129 During'the examination process that follows, which may take up to four months, 130 the exercise of subject debts
13 1
may be put on hold.
The CRPA does not separate creditors or debts into subsets of voting
groups. Instead, all subject debts form a single voting group. 132 However,
an additional vote is required for a subgroup comprised solely of secured
creditors. 13 3 A workout proposal can be approved by the affirmative votes
of the holders of three-fourths of the entire subject debt and the secured
debt. 134 Unlike voting in corporate reorganization, which has requirements with respect to both amount of debt and number of creditors, 135 the
requirement for approval under the CRPA is set in terms of debt amount
only. 136 Therefore, the number of creditors is not considered in voting.
3.

Impact on Corporate Ownership and Control

Unlike a corporate reorganization, a workout under the CRPA does not
necessarily require a change in control or ownership of the subject corporate debtor, a factor that leads managers and controlling shareholders to
prefer the CRPA procedure to corporate reorganization. In many cases,
however, contrary to their expectations, controlling shareholders have lost
control as a result of workouts under the CRPA by way of cancellation of a
control block, together with debt-equity conversion arrangements.
While incumbent managers usually continue running the companies
after the CRPA procedure, creditors should approve major operational
goals, projections, and an asset sale plan. 13 7 Additionally, creditors continuously monitor management of a debtor company by setting up an
approval mechanism for day-to-day business matters, such as cash in-flows
and out-flows, 1 38 and by reviewing the debtor's compliance with the reha139
bilitation plan on a quarterly basis.

129. Id. ch. I, art. 2(5).
130. Id. ch. III, art. 14(2).
131. In principle, the stay of debt exercise is determined at the first creditors' meeting. In exceptional cases, the stay may tentatively be put in place by the request of the
Financial Supervisory Service prior to such a meeting. Id. ch. Ill, art. 14(1).
132. Id. ch. IV, art. 27(1).
133. Id. ch. Ill, art. 17(2).
134. Id. ch. Ill, art. 17(2).
135. David Arthur Skeel Jr., The Nature and Effect of CorporateVoting in Chapter 11
Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REv. 461 (1992).
136. Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act, ch. I, art. 2(4).
137. Id. ch. III, art. 15(1)-(2).
138. Id. ch. III, art. 13(3).
139. Id. ch. I1, art. 16(1).
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Exit Right of Dissenting Creditors

The CRPA provides creditors who oppose a workout with an exit
option via an appraisal right. 140 Upon exercise of the option, if the relevant parties do not agree to the price and terms of the purchase, an independent Coordination Committee shall determine them based on an
expert's appraisal regarding the value of the debtor firm and the feasibility
of a workout. 14 1 Although a properly determined price, based on accurate
appraisal, 1 42 may minimize the possibility of distortion by large creditors,
the Coordination Committee is likely to tilt in the direction of undervalua143
tion given that the Committee tends to favor a successful workout.
5. Linkage to Bankruptcy
The CRPA provides measures to facilitate the conversion of a workout
into a bankruptcy procedure if necessary. 144 Under certain conditions, a
workout plan may turn into a pre-packaged reorganization plan. 145 New
debts extended under a workout arrangement have priority over the
existing unsecured debts held by the subject financial creditors. 146 This
statutory priority can help resolve the debt-overhang problem that a highly
leveraged company encounters in seeking a profitable investment
project.

III.

14 7

Analysis of the Two Rules

A.

Framework of the Analysis

1.

Two Wealth Effects of a Workout

A workout may have effects on the total value of a subject company
and the way such value will be divided among various parties. I label the
former "the efficiency effect" and the latter "the value-diversion effect." As
140. Unless a creditor exercises such an appraisal right, it will be deemed to have
consented to the workout arrangement by operation of law. Id. ch. IV, art. 29(1).
141. In determining the purchase price and terms, the Coordination Committee is to
consider an evaluation extended by a financial expert and the financial status of the
debtor company. Id. ch. IV, art. 29(5). The CRPA does not further spell out the standards of appraisal.
142. Multiple values can be suggested as criteria for the calculation of such appraisal:
liquidation value, reorganization value, and workout value. In February 2002, the Coordination Committee issued a decision on Hynix Semiconductor to the effect that the
purchase price may be calculated on the basis of the "liquidation value" of a debtor.
Such a liquidation value standard might not provide sufficient protection to dissenting
creditors because the liquidation value might be far less than what could result from the
Corporate Reorganization or the workout.
143. Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act, ch. IV, art. 29(5).
144. See generally id. The Act stimulated the South Korean economy partly because of
its flexibility.
145. Id. ch. Ill, art. 20(2); see also id. ch. III, art. 20(1).
146. Id. ch. Ill, art. 18.
147. Stewart Myers initially noticed the debt-overhang problem. See Stewart C. Myers,
Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. EcON. 147, 155 (1977) (demonstrating
how "the existence of corporate debt can reduce the present value of the firm by weakening the corporation's incentive to undertake good future investments").
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compared to a possible outcome realizable under the bankruptcy procedure, the efficiency effect of a workout may be either positive or negative.
When workout reorganization enhances the total value by saving financial
distress costs, facilitating a profitable investment opportunity, or otherwise, it has a positive efficiency effect. In contrast, workout reorganization
might reduce the total value and, thus, have a negative efficiency effect
when it leads to, or makes possible, a suboptimal, or value-reducing, invest148
ment project.
Turning to the value-diversion effect, workout reorganization may
result in a disproportionate allocation among creditors of the total value,
thereby making a value shift among creditors. Interestingly, the Voting Prohibition Rule and the Mandatory Voting Rule may shift value in opposite
directions. Under the assent scheme that the Voting Prohibition Rule mandates, the holdout problem gives rise to the value-diversion effect. Whenever a workout reorganization is completed despite the holdouts, value
flows from those creditors participating in the workout to the nonparticipating creditors. Participants' concessions in the reorganization boost the
debtor's financial capability, which enables the nonparticipating creditors
to be fully or better repaid. As a result, the value of debts held by nonparticipants is buoyed by the completion of a workout.
Under the Mandatory Voting Rule, a binding vote invariably empowers
the majority to take control of important matters affecting all members,
including debt restructuring and governance matters such as ownership of
the post-workout entity. Such control power enables the majority to disproportionately benefit from their control. In the context of corporate governance, controlling shareholders are generally thought to divert non1 49
negligible private benefits via control of corporate decision-making.
Similarly, the major creditors who can dominate a binding vote in a
workout stand to disproportionately benefit from controlling such a vote,
which is binding on all creditors subject to the voting scheme. I label such
disproportionate benefits "private benefits from control of workout." For
example, in exchange for "yes" votes, majority creditors may receive side
benefits from managers or major shareholders, such as early repayment,
security interest, guarantee, or other business opportunities. They may
also obtain and benefit from inside information over the course of the
workout. More directly, the reorganization arrangement may favor major
creditors over other creditors. These examples show that under the
148. A suboptimal investment can result from shareholders' distorted incentives to
engage in high-risk projects in the face of financial stress, which is referred to as "asset
substitution." Concessions in a workout might make such high-risk investment possible. This can be viewed as an agency problem from conflicts of interests between creditors and shareholders. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,
334 (1976) (suggesting that the owner "will have a strong incentive to engage in activities which promise very high payoffs if successful even if they have a very low probability
of success").

149. Empirical evidence suggests that there are substantial private benefits of control.
See supra note 34.
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Mandatory Voting Rule, the private benefits from control of workout
amount to a disproportionate allocation of value (i.e., value-shifting from
non-controlling creditors to controlling creditors).
The private benefits from control of a workout may be material, especially when the voting group holds heterogeneous debts. Suppose, for
example, that a firm owes only two debts (Debt I and Debt 2), having identical priority. The face amount of Debt 1 is $40 and its maturity is TI,
whereas Debt 2 has a face amount of $120 and a maturity of T2. Suppose
also that the firm is reasonably anticipated to generate: (a) a sure cash flow
of $40 at T, and (b) an uncertain cash flow of either $120 or $0, each with
a probability of 50%, at T2. Therefore, Debt 1 will be fully repaid with
certainty at T 1, but Debt 2 has only a 50% chance of being repaid, unless
some kind of recapitalization via workout or bankruptcy is invoked. 150 As
a result, the holder of Debt 1 has no reason to consent to a voting rule for a
workout given the potential conflict of interest between Debt I and Debt
2.151 In contrast, the holder of Debt 2 would benefit from a workout
arrangement that extends the debts' maturity, making the maturity of both
equal, unless the contemplated workout would significantly diminish the
firm's cash flows.' 5

2

Therefore, the holder of Debt 2 has good reason to

seek a workout recapitalization that would help increase its own payoffs,
despite the fact that it might potentially reduce the overall cash flow of the
debtor firm,' 5 3 so long as there is a compulsory voting scheme for the
workout. 1 54 This basic example shows that there is a potential conflict of
interest between different creditors and that a voting rule for a workout
among heterogeneous debts may result in a reduction of overall value,
which constitutes the inefficiency cost of the Mandatory Voting Rule.
2.

Value-Diversion, Divergence, and Inefficient Workouts

If there is no value-diversion effect among creditors, the interest of all
creditors in a voting group will converge toward maximizing the total reorganization value. In such a case, none of the creditors will be in favor of a
value-reducing workout. However, both the Voting Prohibition Rule and
the Mandatory Voting Rule leave open the possibility of value-diversion
effects (though in opposite directions), which may cause the interests of
creditors who stand to disproportionately gain from such a value shift (i.e.,
non-pivotal creditors under an assent scheme and controlling creditors
150. To cope with this kind of problem, the debt contract of Debt 2 may contain an
acceleration clause that is triggered by an event of default. For the purposes of this
example, let us assume that such an acceleration clause does not exist or cannot be
triggered for Debt 2. In this situation, the expected value of cash flows from Debt 2 will
be 60.
151. By contrast, there will be no such conflict of interest among multiple holders of
Debt 1.
152. In this case, the expected value of Debt 2 will increase by 15, which shifts from
Debt 1, assuming that the aggregate cash flow remains intact.
153. The possibility of this value reduction arises, in part, from the agency problem
caused by the conflict of interest between debt and equity holders.
154. The threshold level of cash flow will be 80. At this point, the payoff of Debt 2
under the workout is equal to that without a workout.
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under a voting scheme) to diverge from an efficient, optimal reorganization. Such divergence may be understood as a kind of agency problem in
the context of workout reorganization.
3.

Example, Denotation, and Assumptions

The analysis in this Part of the paper explores the mechanisms by
which the value-diversion effect hinders some efficient workouts under the
Voting Prohibition Rule but yields some inefficient workouts under the
Mandatory Voting Rule.
For this analysis, we consider an imaginary Company A, which has
just become insolvent and whose management is about to propose a
workout reorganization. The timing of events is shown below:
At To,

the management of Company A proposes a workout
reorganization plan that includes debt restructuring,
business restructuring, and new investment projects
creditors of Company A accept or reject the reorganization
proposal under the Voting Prohibition Rule or the
Mandatory Voting Rule, as the case may be
the reorganization plan is implemented (if the creditors
accepted the workout at TI), or bankruptcy proceedings
are started (if the creditors rejected the workout)
the cash flows of Company A are distributed to creditors

At T1,
At T 2,
At T 3,
Let:
Vw
VB

total value of Company A if the proposed workout plan is
accepted and completed
= total value of Company A if the workout proposal fails and
the company goes through bankruptcy proceedings
instead

AV

=

VD
B

=

Vw - VB (net efficiency gain or loss of the workout)

AV reflects all of the benefits and costs of the workout.
The workout is efficient if and only if AV > 0.
= aggregate face amount of debts that Company A owes (i.e.,
the minimum total value of Company A that is needed to
service all debts)
= private benefit from control of workout (under the
Mandatory Voting Rule)

It is assumed for the purposes of this analysis that:
(1) In the bankruptcy proceedings following the failure of the
workout proposal, creditors will receive value proportionate
to the face amount of their debts, but the shareholders of
15 5
Company A will receive nothing;
155. 1 make this assumption merely for ease of illustration. However, the analysis can
also explain a case in which shareholders receive the holdup value. Even the shareholders of insolvent companies might secure some value from holdup in the bargaining process under chapter 11. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining over
Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U.
PA. L. REv. 125, 143 (1990) (finding that in twenty-one of thirty cases when companies
were insolvent, "creditors agreed to allow shareholder recoveries ranging from $400,000
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(2)

(3)

Creditors will make their decisions concerning the workout
solely on the basis of the financial return (that is, non-pecuniary factors are not considered); and
Major creditors have complete information on all of the
variables.

B. The Analysis
1. The Voting ProhibitionRule
Under the Voting Prohibition Rule, majority creditors may not force
minority creditors to join a workout; 156 minority creditors are free to stay
out of a workout. If a workout takes place under the Voting Prohibition
Rule, the holdout creditors may disproportionately benefit from the concessions given by creditors participating in the workout. 157 Hence, value
may shift from participating creditors to holdout creditors.
Thus, under the Voting Prohibition Rule, creditors can be separated
into two categories in terms of their incentives regarding workout. One
category of creditors is major creditors, each of whom is individually essential and pivotal to the completion of the workout reorganization. These
creditors cannot benefit by holding out because doing so will result in the
failure of the entire workout. The other group is comprised of creditors
whose participation, viewed individually, is not pivotal to the completion
of the workout. Nevertheless, such creditors, taken collectively, might be
critical to the workout and, thus, their collective holdout might result in the
failure of a workout attempt.
For this analysis, suppose that the major creditors will operate on the
premise that all of the non-pivotal minority creditors will hold out. Further, let a be the ratio of debt held by major creditors to that held by all
creditors.
Workout reorganization takes place if and only if the major creditors
find that their payoffs from a workout are greater than those from a potential bankruptcy procedure. Their payoffs from a workout are greater if and
only if the expected efficiency gain of the proposed workout is at least as
great as the value to be shifted to the holdout creditors.
PROPOSITION 1. Under the Voting Prohibition Rule, workout reorganization

will occur if and only if the following inequality is true:
INEQUALITY (1)

VW

-

(1

-

Q)VD > aVB.

The portion (1 - a)VD represents that the non-participants will be fully
paid as a result of the workout. Hence, the left-hand side of Inequality (1)
is the post-workout value of Company A remaining after full repayment to
the holdouts. This remaining value will be further allocated among the
to $63 million"); see also Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 780 (noting that shareholders "often
use their delaying power to extract a substantial value even in instances in which the
creditors are entitled to all of the reorganization value").
156. Roe, supra note 1, at 250-51, 253.
157. Id. at 233.
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participating creditors and the shareholders.' 5 8 The right-hand side of Inequality (1) is the value of debts held by the pivotal, major creditors in the
potential bankruptcy proceedings, which constitutes the opportunity cost
to these creditors of accepting a workout. Recall that the shareholders are
assumed to receive nothing in a potential bankruptcy. Likewise, the inequality may be rearranged as follows, noticeably showing the contrast of
the efficiency effect with the value-diversion effect:
INEQUALITY

(2)

Vw

-

VB (= AW) >

(1

-

a)(VD

-

VB).

The left side of Inequality (2) is the efficiency effect of the proposed
workout, and the right side is the value-diversion effect to be gained by the
holdout creditors. Inequality (2) shows that under the Voting Prohibition
Rule, a workout can be completed only if the efficiency effect outweighs the
value-diversion effect.
The analysis reveals both the advantages and disadvantages of the Voting Prohibition Rule. It is superior to the Mandatory Voting Rule in
preventing inefficient workout attempts that take on negative efficiency
effects (i.e., where AV < 0). In this regard, the value-diversion effect (by
which value would flow from participants to non-participants) serves to
align the interests of major creditors with overall efficiency, because major
creditors stand to benefit only from the portion of the efficiency gain
exceeding the value-diversion effect. The downside of the Voting Prohibition Rule is that it may stymie some efficient workout efforts where
expected efficiency gain falls short of the value-diversion effect.
In the analysis, the ratio of participating creditors to total creditors (a)
is given. By modifying Inequalities (1) and (2), we may come up with the
minimum ratio of participating creditors that is needed to complete the
workout with the level of the efficiency effect and value-diversion effect
taken as given (let d denote such minimum ratio):
6. Vo- Vw
VD - VB

The minimum-ratio condition shows that the minimum ratio is in
inverse proportion to the size of the positive efficiency effect (i.e., the difference between Vw and VB). The larger the efficiency gain, the lesser the
minimum ratio of the participants.
2.

The Mandatory Voting Rule

Under the Mandatory Voting Rule, minority creditors cannot hold out;
major creditors may dominate the workout procedure and stand to dispro158. Therefore, Inequality (1) can be a necessary condition for the creditors' consent
to the workout, rather than a sufficient condition. The sufficient condition for the creditors' agreement to the workout will be (let Sw represent the value received by the shareholders in the workout):
VW - (1 - a)VD - Sw > aVB.

In the text, I present the necessary condition instead of the sufficient condition in order
to show more clearly the efficiency effect and the value-diversion effect.
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portionately benefit from the workout. 159 Thus, value shifts from the noncontrolling creditors to the controlling creditors. In this regard, we may
classify creditors into two different groups under the Mandatory Voting
Rule. One group is comprised of controlling creditors who can effectively
dominate the outcome of the vote. The other group consists of the remaining non-controlling creditors. For purposes of the analysis, let a denote the
160
ratio of debts held by the group of controlling creditors to the total debt.
A workout will be completed if and only if the payoffs to the controlling creditors from a workout are greater than those from a potential bankruptcy. The payoffs to controlling creditors from a workout are comprised
of two components: (i) the pro rata value in the workout reorganization
and (ii) the private benefits from control of the workout.
PROPOSITION 2. Under the Mandatory Voting Rule, a workout reorganiza16 1
tion will occur if and only if the following inequality is true:

INEQUALITY

(3)

P(Vw - B)

+

B

>

3V B.

The left side of Inequality (3) represents the controlling creditors'
payoffs from the proposed workout, which is the sum of the pro rata value
and private benefits from control of workout. The right side represents the
value of their debts if bankruptcy proceedings ensue after the workout fails.
Rearranged as Inequality (4), the following expression contrasts the efficiency effect with the value-diversion effect:
INEQUALITY

(4)

VW

- VB =

(AV) >

(1-

)B

The left side represents the efficiency effect of the workout. The
numerator of the right side represents the value-diversion effect flowing
159. See Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act, Law No. 6504, ch. III, art. 17 (2001)
(S. Korea).
160. The Mandatory Voting Rule should set the requisite ratio necessary for the passage of a reorganization proposal. The requisite ratio may be either simple-majority
(50%) or super-majority (greater than 50%). The CRPA sets 75% as the requisite ratio of
voting. Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act, ch. IV, art. 27. A question may arise:
"Does 3, the ratio of debts held by the controlling creditors, have to be at least the requisite ratio?" If is greater than the requisite ratio, then control would be certain and
stable. Nonetheless, the controlling creditors might exercise an effective control over
voting even with 3 short of the contractual or statutory requisite ratio. Similarly, controlling shareholders may exert effective control with ownership short of majority. The
non-controlling creditors might lack information necessary to make a proper evaluation
concerning the wealth effect of a proposed reorganization plan or find it unprofitable to
attempt to gather and assess such information. Furthermore, such minority creditors
might defer such evaluation to the controlling creditors.
161. Viewed more precisely, the sufficient condition for the controlling creditors' vote
in favor of the workout will be (let Sw represent the value received by the shareholders in
the workout):
P(Vw - B - Sw) + B > 3VB.
Again, in the text, I present the necessary condition instead of the sufficient condition
because the necessary condition helps show more clearly the efficiency effect and the
value-diversion effect.
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from the non-controlling creditors to the controllers under the Mandatory
Voting Rule (i.e., private benefits from control of workout voting).
This analysis shows both the advantages and disadvantages of the
Mandatory Voting Rule. It is superior to the Voting Prohibition Rule in that
it will facilitate any proposed efficient workout (i.e., where AV > 0). The
controlling creditors can always benefit from the efficiency gain of such a
workout. By contrast, the downside of the Mandatory Voting Rule is that it
enables some inefficient workouts. The controlling creditors will vote for
an inefficient workout if it furnishes greater payoffs to them because of the
private benefits of controlling a workout. 1 62 Although all creditors pay the
costs of an inefficient workout, the controlling creditors monopolize the
private benefits from control of workout. Such asymmetry might induce
the controlling creditors to pursue an inefficient reorganization at the
expense of the minority creditors.
3.

Comparing the Two Rules

The analysis demonstrates a clear trade-off between facilitating efficient workouts and deterring inefficient workouts. The Voting Prohibition
Rule stops every inefficient workout attempt but also hinders some efficient workout efforts. In contrast, the Mandatory Voting Rule makes every
efficient workout possible but induces some inefficient workouts. As such,
neither of the two rules perform optimally under all circumstances.
The following examples enable us to identify certain conditions under
which one of the two rules is better than the other. First, suppose a nearinsolvent company has numerous bondholders, none of whom are individually pivotal to the success of the workout. In this case, the holdout problem may well substantially deter an otherwise efficient workout 1 63 but
concern about private benefits from control is modest. Here, the
Mandatory Voting Rule that requires a voting scheme may perform nicely
by stopping the holdouts and aligning the interests of all creditors. Conversely, the Voting Prohibition Rule may exacerbate the holdout problem
by blocking the introduction of a voting scheme. Next, suppose a different
situation where a handful of financial institutions hold the majority of debt
claims with only a few other minor bondholders. In this case, even though
the bondholders are likely to hold out, the major financial institutional
creditors may be able to complete a viable workout even without a voting
scheme in place.1 6 4 The absence of a voting scheme will most likely cause
the interests of the major creditors to align with overall efficiency. Here,
the Voting Prohibition Rule may work better than the Mandatory Voting
162. See Roe, supra note 1, at 263-67. Such workout reorganization may help cause
the insolvent company to engage in a suboptimal and value-reducing project, especially
in conjunction with shareholders' distorted incentives in the face of financial stress.
163. See Gilson, supra note 6, at 317 (arguing that "having more creditors increases
the likelihood that any one creditor will hold out").
164. See id. at 317 (finding that private restructuring succeeds more frequently when
there are fewer creditors).
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Rule. Table 1 summarizes the contrasting features of the two opposite
schemes.
Table 1
Wealth Effects of the Two Rules
Voting Prohibition Rule

Mandatory Voting Rule

Value-Shift
Effect

From workoutparticipants to nonparticipants
* Holdout problem

From minority to
controlling creditors
Private benefits from
workout control

Efficiency
Effect

Stops any proposed
inefficient workouts
* Stymies some efficient
workouts

Facilitates any
proposed efficient
workouts
Induces some
inefficient workouts

Suitable Case

Concentrated debt

Dispersed debt holding

holding

Debtors, not creditors, incur the efficiency effect of the two rules, insofar as the price terms of debts reflect the efficiency effect. 1 65 Therefore,
absent a statutory intervention, debtors may well have the right incentives
to make the most efficient choice between an assent scheme and a voting
scheme ex ante. Both of the rules can be suboptimal in the sense that they
restrict the parties' freedom to choose a proper scheme.
C.

Evaluating the Mandatory Voting Rule

1. Aligning Controlling Creditors with Efficiency
Under the Mandatory Voting Rule, creditors might choose an inefficient workout because of. the private benefits derived from control, an
effect which causes the interests of majority creditors to diverge from efficiency. Inequality (4), in Part III.B.2, shows that as the private benefits
from control (i.e., (1 - P)B) become minimized, the likelihood that majority
creditors will accept a value-reducing workout is also minimized. Reducing
private benefits from control will cause the controllers' incentives to align
more closely with an efficient workout result.
Establishing legal standards for workout may help reduce opportunism by controlling creditors who may divert private benefits to the detriment of total value, as good corporate law reduces such opportunism in the
context of corporate governance. 16 6 South Korea's CRPA requires that debt
restructuring "be achieved fairly and with meeting the equity," although it
165. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 148, at 313 (observing that the price that
minority shareholders will pay for shares "will reflect the . . . effect of the divergence
between the manager's interest and theirs").
166. See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1114 (1998).
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does not articulate what this phrase means. 16 7 Courts may utilize this
abstract standard as a tool to restrict the machinations of majority creditors. In making the case for repealing the Prohibition Rule of the Trust
Indenture Act, Professor Roe proposed a simple and flexible standard
prohibiting fraud and distortion in bond recapitalization as a replacement
for the voting prohibition of the Trust Indenture Act. 168
Increasing the requisite ratio of voting may also help reduce private
benefits from controlling a workout. The dual voting requirements, which
set the threshold in terms of the number of creditors as well as of the debt
1 70
amount, 169 may be considered, as they are in chapter 11 proceedings.
Providing dissenting creditors with an adequate appraisal right may
also reduce private benefits. This would serve to secure some minimum
value for minority creditors and effectively set a ceiling for private benefits
from controlling workout. A shortcoming of the appraisal right is that the
time, cost, and uncertainty involved might make workout reorganization
more costly and less attractive. Also, there can be great difficulty in setting
a standard for valuation that would give all participants the right
incentives.
2.

Trade-offs: FacilitatingWorkout and Reducing Bankruptcy Costs

The Mandatory Voting Rule under the CRPA shares some features with
the voting regime in chapter 11. Both institutions, without requiring a contractual ground, install a vote-based reorganization 17 1 outside or inside of
bankruptcy. 17 2 It is fairly evident that a workout under the Mandatory
Voting Rule has a competitive edge over chapter 11 in speed and flexibility.
Still, chapter 11 has its own advantages, especially in reducing the valuediversion effect (i.e., private benefits from control). Court scrutiny in chapter 11 procedures' 73 may help restrain major creditors from taking private
benefits, as compared to the vote-based workout procedure under the
Mandatory Voting Rule.
Here, we encounter a trade-off and dilemma involving the Mandatory
Voting Rule. On one hand, it facilitates successful out-of-court workouts by
instituting a mandatory voting scheme. 174 In doing so, however, it may not
be effective in reducing bankruptcy costs because of that same scheme.
Given its powerful impact on reorganization, the workout procedure under
the Mandatory Voting Rule might be perceived, in effect, as an alternative
to bankruptcy reorganization. That is, various constituencies such as cus167. Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act, Law No. 6504, ch. 1II, art. 17(1) (2001)
(S. Korea).
168. Roe, supra note 1, at 269-72.
169. Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act, ch. IV, art 27.
170. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c)-(d) (2006).
171. Id.; Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act, ch. IV, art. 27.
172. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 38, at 677 (pointing out as one of the advantages of bankruptcy reorganization that majorities of creditors can bind dissenting
minorities through voting).
173. See, e.g., id. at 681-83.
174. Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act, ch. IV, art. 27.
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tomers, suppliers, and employees may respond to workout under the
Mandatory Voting Rule similarly to the way that they would respond in
chapter 11 proceedings. As a result, the Mandatory Voting Rule might
undermine a workout's utility in saving bankruptcy costs. Ironically,
although the Mandatory Voting Rule is meant to establish an effective
mechanism for facilitating reorganization outside of court, it may result in
a less attractive type of workout reorganization.
The CRPA of South Korea offers a powerful mechanism for facilitating
workouts, but it results in an inferior type of workout, stripped of certain
useful attributes in terms of saving bankruptcy costs. The approach of the
CRPA demonstrates a clear trade-off between facilitating workouts and
reducing bankruptcy costs. The Mandatory Voting Rule under the CRPA
provides an opportunity to reflect on the nature of workouts. A workout
basically constitutes a contract between various creditors and the debtor to
recapitalize debt. A workout can be seen as a bargain among creditors,
based on the belief that such a bargain may bring gains to the entire group
of creditors and that such gains will be divided among them. A voting
scheme can still be a part of the bargain so long as it is based on the consensus of participants. In this regard, there is good reason to doubt that
the CRPA procedure still takes on the nature of a workout.
D.

Comparing with Analysis on Control Transfer Rules

This Part's analysis can be viewed as parallel to Professor Lucian
Bebchuk's analysis on rules governing corporate control blocks. 1 75 With
respect to the two contrary rules on the sale of control blocks, the Market
Rule and the Equal Opportunity Rule, 176 Professor Bebchuk presents the
well-known trade-offs between facilitating efficient sales of control blocks
and stopping inefficient sales. 17 7 The distinction between these paradigmatic rules is centered on whether each rule entitles minority shareholders
to join the sale of a control block by a controlling shareholder. 178 The
Market Rule, widely adopted in the United States, allows controlling shareholders to sell their control blocks without letting minority shareholders
share in the gains. 17 9 In comparison, the Equal Opportunity Rule entitles
non-controlling shareholders to participate in, or otherwise benefit from,
the control transaction, thereby preventing the controlling shareholder
from monopolizing the gains. 180 Professor Bebchuk observed that, from
the efficiency perspective, the Market Rule serves efficient sales but fails to
deter inefficient sales, whereas the Equal Opportunity Rule stops inefficient sales but also impedes some efficient sales. 18 1
175. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control, 109
EcON. 957 (1994).
176. Id. at 964, 968.
177. Id. at 963.
178. See id. at 964, 968.
179. See id. at 964.
180. See id. at 965.
181. See id. at 957.

Q.J.
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A remarkable analogy can be found between the two sets of trade-offs
shown by Professor Bebchuk and those analyzed in this paper. Both sets of
trade-offs result from the direction of the value-diversion effect. When the
value-diversion effect flows from minority to majority (as with the
Mandatory Rule and the Market Rule), the rules facilitate any efficient proposed transaction but induce some inefficient transactions as well, because
of the controllers' partial misalignment of interest with overall efficiency.
When the value-diversion effect flows from majority to minority (as with
the Prohibition Rule and the Equal Opportunity Rule), the rules stop any
proposed inefficient transactions but deter some efficient ones as well.
Conclusion
Workouts are based on consensus among participants, 1 82 whereas
chapter 11 procedures rely on voting. 18 3 Even in the world of workouts,
however, voting has been utilized. This paper has identified two contrasting legal approaches to voting and workouts by looking at two seemingly
unrelated statutes in South Korea and the United States. The American
approach, which bans voting in workouts, serves to keep the consensual
nature of workouts intact and thereby stops any opportunistic, inefficient
workout attempts but blocks some efficient workout efforts as well. The
South Korean approach, which mandates voting in workouts, will facilitate
any efficient workout effort but also permits some opportunistic, inefficient workouts. The Mandatory Voting Rule in South Korea provides an
opportunity to reflect on the nature of workouts. A workout basically constitutes a bargain to recapitalize debt among various parties with differing
interests. A voting scheme may be part of the bargain so long as it is based
on the participants' consensus. Thus, there is reason to doubt that the
Mandatory Voting Rule falls solidly within the nature of a workout. The
South Korean rule offers a powerful mechanism for facilitating workouts,
but it may end up bringing about an inferior workout in terms of saving
bankruptcy costs.

182. See Gertner & Scharfstein, supra note 7, at 1191.
183. 11 U.S.C.§ 1126(c)-(d) (2006).

